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INTRODUCTION: THE “MYTH” OF DOCTRINAL CONSTRAINT 
As the dominant approach to legal analysis in the United States today, 
Legal Realism is firmly ensconced in the way scholars discuss and debate 
legal issues and problems.1 The phrase “we are all realists now” is treated as 
cliché precisely because it is in some ways taken to state an obvious reality 
about the mindset of American legal scholars.2 While Legal Realism came 
to represent a variety of different views, all of these views embodied a 
common theme, namely, the belief that legal doctrine is “more malleable, 
less determinate, and less causal of judicial outcomes” than is traditionally 
presumed.3 Judges in this view are taken to decide cases based on what they 
consider “fair” under the circumstances, “rather than on the basis of the 
applicable rules of law.”4 Judicial reasoning, the Realists argued, was rarely 
ever the “constrained product of legal doctrine and legal materials alone.”5 
A hallmark of Legal Realism was therefore pervasive “skepticism” about the 
constraining effect of legal doctrine on judicial opinions and scholarly 
critiques of judge-made law.6 The constraint of legal doctrine was thus 
believed to be mythical. 
In the many decades since its arrival, the scholarly literature examining 
the scope, influence, virtues, vices, and varieties of Legal Realism has grown 
exponentially.7 Acknowledging the dominance of Legal Realism as a way of 
 
1 See Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. 
REV. 267, 274 (1997) (“Realism is omnipresent in American law schools and legal culture . . . .”). 
2 Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism as Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915, 1917 
(2005) (emphasis omitted); Leiter, supra note 1, at 267-68. 
3 Frederick Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed, 91 TEX. L. REV. 749, 750 n.2 (2013). 
4 Leiter, supra note 1, at 275. 
5 Schauer, supra note 3, at 753. 
6 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-
Legal Process Era, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 691, 694 (1987) (noting the “corrosive skepticism about 
legal rules and doctrine preached . . . by many of the ‘legal realists’”). 
7 For a sampling of the literature, see JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 
(1935); LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927–1967 (1986); BRIAN LEITER, 
NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN 
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (2007); JULIUS PAUL & LEON GREEN, THE LEGAL REALISM OF 
JEROME N. FRANK: A STUDY OF FACT-SKEPTICISM AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1959); 
WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (2d ed. 2014); L. L. 
Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429 (1934); Grant Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its 
Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037 (1961); Anthony Kronman, Jurisprudential Responses to Legal 
Realism, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 335 (1988); Myres S. McDougal, Law School of the Future: From 
Legal Realism to Policy Science in the World Community, 56 YALE L.J. 1345 (1947); David B. Wilkins, 
Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468 (1990); Calvin Woodard, The Limits of Legal 
Realism: An Historical Perspective, 54 VA. L. REV. 689 (1968); Daniel A. Farber, Toward a New 
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thinking, legal academics continue to debate the extent to which the Realists 
were saying something altogether new, and indeed whether they mischarac-
terized their predecessors.8 Despite the voluminous body of literature on 
Legal Realism, hardly anyone has sought to examine systematically the 
actual effect of its central premise on the style, form, and substance of legal 
reasoning undertaken by courts in different doctrinal areas. If legal doctrine 
does not constrain judicial reasoning (or at best does so minimally), as the 
Legal Realists claimed, and this reality is widely accepted by all participants 
in the judicial system, we might expect to see a difference in the way courts 
approach their task of deciding cases and providing reasons for their 
decisions. Yet, the fact remains that we simply do not.  
In a variety of substantive areas, judicial opinions continue to speak the 
language of legal doctrine, and legal doctrine remains the “currency”9 of 
legal analysis. Judges—at least on the face of things—appear as constrained 
or unconstrained by legal doctrine today as they appeared to be prior to the 
influence of Legal Realism. Consider a pair of copyright cases as an 
example. In 1908, the Supreme Court decided White-Smith Music Publishing 
Co. v. Apollo Co., and held that a manufacturer of perforated piano rolls 
did not commit copyright infringement, since the rolls were not “copies” 
for the purposes of copyright law.10 In arriving at its conclusion, the Court 
looked to prior nonbinding case law, legislative intent, its own construction 
of the statute, and the common understanding of the term “copy.”11 The 
only express suggestion of constraint in the Court’s opinion is its observa-
tion—in dicta—that if the prior case law had been of a “binding character” 
it would have “preclud[ed] further consideration of the question.”12 Now, 
contrast this with a case decided by the Court in 2014, American Broadcasting 
Co. v. Aereo, Inc.13 The question before the Court was whether a service 
that re-transmitted free broadcasting content to subscribers over the 
 
Legal Realism, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 279 (2001) (book review); Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism 
Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465 (1988) (book review). 
8 See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST–REALIST DIVIDE: THE 
ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING (2009); Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What is 
the Issue?, 16 LEGAL THEORY 111 (2010); Alfred L. Brophy, Did Formalism Never Exist?, 92 TEX. 
L. REV. 383 (2013) (book review); Edward Rubin, The Real Formalists, the Real Realists, and What 
They Tell Us About Judicial Decision Making and Legal Education, 109 MICH. L. REV. 863 (2011) 
(book review). 
9 Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, What is Legal Doctrine?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 517, 517 
(2006). 
10 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908). 
11 Id. at 12-17. 
12 Id. at 12. 
13 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). 
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Internet had committed copyright infringement by engaging in a “public 
performance” for the purposes of copyright law.14 In answering the question 
in the affirmative, the Court justified its conclusion entirely by reference to 
the legislative history of the statute’s definitions of “public” and “perform” 
and its own reconstruction of Congress’s regulatory intent underlying the 
statute.15  
The similarity in style and reasoning in the two opinions is stark and 
real. Both speak the language of formal legal doctrine, both make reference 
to precedent (when available), both defer to Congressional “intent” and 
purpose, and both rely as best as possible on the text of the statute. One was 
crafted in a pre-Realist era and the other well after the dominance of Legal 
Realism. Their puzzling parallelism highlights the central questions that 
this Symposium set out to answer: Does legal doctrine in fact continue to 
“constrain” judicial reasoning, even after almost every participant in the 
legal system today has come into contact with the central premise of Legal 
Realism (i.e., the supposed myth of doctrinal constraint)? Are there ways of 
reconciling courts’ post-Realist use of legal doctrine with the core insights 
of Legal Realism? How uniform—across the law—is this apparent continuity 
in the use of legal doctrine? 
Instead of seeking to answer these questions in the abstract as 
philosophical inquiries, the Symposium instead chose to have leading legal 
scholars, each from a different substantive area of law, reflect on the role of 
legal doctrine in their respective areas of expertise. Our hope was that 
having scholars reflect on this issue by reference to their own fields of 
expertise would address the question of “doctrinal constraint” in the 
American legal system organically and trans-substantively. The areas chosen 
were drawn from both federal and state law, statutory and common law, and 
represented areas traditionally characterized as public law and private law.16 
Some scholars chose to reflect on the question by looking at their field as a 
whole, while others reflected on the issue through specific cases, rules, or 
problems unique to their particular field. 
In what follows, I will begin in Part I by unpacking the various senses in 
which doctrine might be seen to “constrain” legal and judicial reasoning, the 
central question that unites the Articles that follow. Part II will summarize 
some of the key findings on the constraint of legal doctrine that emerge 
 
14 Id. at 2504. 
15 Id. at 2504-10. 
16 The areas chosen for presentation at the Symposium were tort law, contract law, property 
law, criminal law, copyright law, the law of corporations, the law of evidence, family law, 
constitutional law, administrative law, conflict of laws, and the role of legal categories in the law. 
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from the Symposium contributions. Part III will then conclude by remind-
ing readers of a now-forgotten, but nonetheless important, piece of scholar-
ship published in this journal that addressed the very question of this 
Symposium eight decades ago, challenging the extreme version of the Legal 
Realist claim. 
I. THE MULTIPLE CONSTRAINTS OF LEGAL DOCTRINE 
What exactly does it mean for doctrine to “constrain” legal and judicial 
reasoning? Depending on how widely or narrowly one understands the 
notion of a constraint, the question becomes either profoundly controversial 
or singularly uninteresting. In the rest of this Part, I advance three analytically 
distinct conceptions of what it might mean for legal doctrine to constrain 
the reasoning employed by judges (and lawyers). The categories identified 
below admit of some overlap and are often hard to disaggregate in application. 
Yet, their analytical bases remain fundamentally distinct. Each of these 
conceptions also finds instantiation—in part, in whole, or in conjunction 
with others—in the individual articles that follow, though I will not venture 
to suggest which particular one is at play in each article. 
A. Mechanistic Constraint 
The first, and perhaps most extreme, form of constraint that legal 
reasoning by judges is sometimes accused of, entails the internalization of 
the belief that legal rules play a deductive role in adjudication, such that any 
given legal decision is fully determinable by an applicable rule. In this view, 
the direct application of a rule to the facts of a dispute is seen to yield a 
rationally determinate answer.17 Legal reasoning is thus “constrained” by 
doctrine insofar as that doctrine dictates not just its own applicability, but 
also individual outcomes upon its actual application. This form of constraint 
earned the name “mechanical jurisprudence,” and was used by the Legal 
Realists as a pejorative to describe classical legal thinking, that is, Legal 
Formalism.18 
Few, if any, would suggest (or believe) that judges and other actors 
today feel constrained by legal doctrine in this extreme sense—that is, as 
 
17 See Leiter, supra note 8, at 111.  
18 See Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908); see also 
ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 78-79 (1998) 
(describing this usage and its origins). 
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“automaton[s].”19 It presupposes a belief in both the autonomy of legal 
reasoning and in the obligatory nature of that autonomy. Indeed, as some 
have pointed out, this form of constraint is often a caricature rather than an 
accurate representation of how judicial decisionmaking in any real context 
actually works. Nonetheless, it represents an extreme and idealized 
understanding of doctrinal constraint that is often used as a foil to criticize 
judicial reasoning. 
B. Structural Constraint 
A second way in which legal doctrine might constrain decisionmakers is 
by structuring the question in a way that renders certain aspects of the 
dispute/controversy at hand more or less salient than others, thereby 
emphasizing particular elements of the dispute during its resolution. 
Psychologists refer to this in other contexts as the “framing effect” that 
influences certain kinds of decisions. 20  One might thus consider legal 
doctrine to do the same, i.e., constrain the decision by framing the inquiry 
and analysis, in situations where it applies. Doctrine in this understanding 
constrains by directing attention towards certain aspects of the factual 
record, and rendering certain other elements of the dispute altogether 
irrelevant or secondary to the analysis. As one early scholar, identifying this 
framing function of doctrine for judges, put it, “[doctrine] supplies a 
structure for his thought to follow, [and] draws a sketch map for him of the 
way into and through a case.”21 
On occasion we see courts recognizing this constraint of framing, and 
consciously rejecting particular doctrinal categories during their analysis 
solely to avoid being limited by such a choice. Consider the New Jersey 
Supreme Court’s refusal in the famed case of State v. Shack to analyze the 
problem before it using landlord–tenant law.22  The court categorically 
observed that there was “no profit in trying to decide upon a conventional 
category and then forcing the present subject into it” since such an 
“approach would be artificial and distorting.”23 In this observation the court 
can be seen to suggest that a particular doctrinal category might constrain 
 
19 John Dickinson, Legal Rules: Their Function in the Process of Decision, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 
833 (1931) [hereinafter Dickinson, Legal Rules]. Dickinson traced this conception back to 
Montesquieu. Id.  
20 See, e.g. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of 
Choice, 211 SCI. 453 (1981). 
21 Dickinson, Legal Rules, supra note 19, at 849. 
22 277 A.2d 369, 374 (N.J. 1971). 
23 Id. 
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its reasoning, by “forcing” it to approach the problem in a way demanded 
by that category. 
Unlike the absolutist model of internalized deduction, the constraint of 
framing recognizes doctrine to legitimately constrain, but in a more limited 
manner. Additionally, it makes no supposition about the autonomy of the 
doctrine, or about the irrelevance of non-legal criteria. Indeed, it accepts the 
possibility (and on occasion embraces the idea) that the constraint of 
doctrine is motivated by normative considerations on which legal 
doctrines are superimposed (e.g., efficiency, or information costs). 
C. Conventionalist Constraint (Versus Rationalization) 
A third important way in which doctrine might be seen to constrain 
judicial reasoning originates in the norms and practices of the legal community, 
the primary audience for a judge’s opinions and orders. To the extent that 
judges are members of a community where their opinion writing is seen to 
require express reliance on the language of legal doctrine, judicial reasoning 
comes to be constrained by those practices, and in the process, legal 
doctrine. In this understanding, the constraint comes less from doctrine 
itself and more from the norms surrounding its use within the relevant 
community.24 If it is indeed the case that the community of lawyers and 
judges articulate their reasoning in a particular way,25 judges might thus 
actually reach a decision based on criteria other than legal doctrine, but then 
feel compelled to adhere to the conventions of opinion writing and present 
their decision in the language of doctrine.26 Legal doctrine then—through 
its surrounding conventions—becomes a constraint. The conventionalist 
constraint is thus in large part a “stylistic” constraint, where adherence to a 
particular style in the expression of legal reasoning is seen as obligatory. 
To the Legal Realists, of course, the existence of such conventions was 
hardly a constraint. To many of them, most notably Felix Cohen and 
 
24 For an excellent account of such conventions, see Richard A. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles 
(And Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421 (1995). Posner characterizes the account of 
judicial opinion writing that exhibits the constraint described above as the “pure” style of opinion 
writing. Id. at 1429. He notes that in this style, opinions “conform[] closely to professional 
expectations about the structure and style of a judicial opinion” and that the style uses “technical 
legal terms without translation into everyday English, quotes heavily from previous judicial 
opinions, [and] complies scrupulously with whatever are the current conventions of citation 
form.” Id.  
25 For a useful exploration of whether lawyers think and reason differently from others, see 
Nathan Isaacs, How Lawyers Think, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 555 (1923). 
26 See Posner, supra note 24, at 1431 (noting how adherence to the conventions of “pure” 
opinion writing plays a persuasive role in legitimizing the decision and conforms to audience 
expectation). 
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Jerome Frank, the process of articulating a judicial opinion in the language 
of legal doctrine when the actual reasoning of the judge originated 
independently of the doctrine, i.e., in extra-doctrinal considerations, was 
indeed the basic problem.27 The process was instead to them nothing more 
than formal ex post “rationalization,” where doctrine enabled judges to 
“conceal” the real reasons for the decision.28 Cohen thus observed that in 
such judicial rationalization the doctrinal “grounds of decision often represent 
nothing more objective than a resolution to use sanctified words wherever 
specified results are dictated by undisclosed determinants.”29 
The difference between the constraint of convention and “rationaliza-
tion” is subtle yet analytically important for our purposes. In the former, 
the constraint is real in the sense of obligating courts to speak the formal 
language of legal doctrine in order to legitimate their opinions and maintain 
systemic continuity with other participants (i.e., other courts, superior 
courts, lawyers); whereas in the latter, the constraint is artificial and 
entirely a trope that is set up to justify the court’s exclusive reliance on 
doctrine, which in turn masks the true grounds of decision. Determining 
when a court relies on one or the other is often a complex empirical ques-
tion that is hard to answer in any individual case.  
 
*      *      * 
 
The multiple senses in which legal doctrine can be understood to 
“constrain” judicial reasoning thus serve to complicate the question of 
whether courts are indeed so constrained today, despite the influence of 
Legal Realism. There is, of course, the further issue of whether such 
constraints—even if shown to exist as an empirical matter—serve important 
systemic and institutional purposes (such as the maintenance of a separation 
of powers) that render their real or artificial nature somewhat secondary. 
The articles in this issue grapple with these dimensions of doctrinal 
constraint as well, as they relate to the individual substantive areas under 
investigation. 
 
27 See FELIX S. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS 237 (1959); FRANK, 
supra, note 7, at 130 (“[O]ne of their chief uses is to enable the judges to give formal justifica-
tions . . . of the conclusions at which they otherwise arrive.”). 
28 COHEN, supra note 27, at 238; FRANK, supra note 7, at 130. 
29 COHEN, supra note 27, at 237. 
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II. THE CONSTRAINT OF LEGAL DOCTRINE IN  
DIFFERENT AREAS OF THE LAW 
As noted previously, each of the articles in this issue examines the 
question of doctrinal constraint within a particular area of the law, in an 
effort to shed light on the overall role of legal doctrine today within the 
world of legal and judicial reasoning. Not surprisingly, each approaches the 
question somewhat differently. The overwhelming conclusion that the 
contributions point to may seem somewhat unexceptional: legal doc-
trine remains an important constraining force on legal and judicial reason-
ing today. What the contributions additionally highlight, though, is how 
different substantive areas have internalized the idea of constraint into their 
everyday functioning.  
As a purely empirical matter, there appears to be hardly any substantive 
area of law that has managed to distance itself altogether (or even signifi-
cantly) from relying on legal rules and principles in its approach to reasoning. 
The challenge, of course, is determining why this constraint continues to 
exist, even after the rule- and doctrine-skepticism of Legal Realism. As 
Brian Leiter’s contribution in this issue argues, not only was this to be 
expected, but it was also in keeping with the fundamental premise of Legal 
Realism.30 Since legal doctrine is little more than a crystallization of a 
particular set of normative standards in an area, and the Realists acknowl-
edged that judges decide cases by reference to normative criteria, it was in 
some ways inevitable that doctrine would remain an aspect of legal reason-
ing even in a post–Legal Realist landscape.31 To Leiter, the contemporary 
importance of doctrine—reformed to bring it closer to the real normative 
criteria actually used by courts—represents the success, rather than the 
failure, of Legal Realism.32  
Hanoch Dagan’s contribution focuses on the role of doctrinal categories 
in the law, and their compatibility with the core lessons of Legal Realism.33 
Unlike others, however, Dagan offers a reconstructed version of Legal 
Realism that builds on his prior work. In his account, Legal Realism, when 
so “charitably interpreted,” sees the need for doctrinal categories so long as 
they do not assume a life of their own and exhaust the domain of legal 
reasoning. 34 Doctrine—and doctrinal categories—are, to Dagan, compo-
 
30 Brian Leiter, Legal Realism and Legal Doctrine, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1975, 1975 (2015). 
31 Id. at 1983-84. 
32 Id. 
33 Hanoch Dagan, Doctrinal Categories, Legal Realism, and the Rule of Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 
1889, 1890 (2015). 
34 Id. 
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nents of the lawyer’s craft, which Realism sees as critical.35 Dagan 
therefore suggests that once Legal Realism is reconstructed in this manner, 
the “puzzle” of contemporary doctrinal dominance despite the influence of 
Realism disappears altogether, since doctrine comes to be seen as one 
important—though not the only—component of legal decisionmaking in the 
Realist universe. In this respect, his conclusion is similar to Leiter’s.36 
Whether or not Legal Realism ever set out to eliminate any and all 
reliance on doctrine, Celia Fassberg’s fascinating account of the “conflict of 
laws revolution” that was spearheaded by Legal Realists shows us precisely 
why such a wholesale abandonment (of legal doctrine) may have been 
wrong-headed from its very conception.37 Fassberg shows how conflict of 
law scholarship and law reform initiatives in the mid-twentieth 
century attempted to distance legal reasoning from formal blackletter 
doctrine and conceptual thinking, in an effort to focus on the real normative 
and strategic considerations that were at play in courts’ decisions.38 The 
result, as Fassberg points out, was complete disarray, eventually resulting 
in a return to more structured doctrinal mechanisms.39 Fassberg places the 
primary blame for this on the Legal Realist critique of doctrine, but 
cautions that conflict of laws as an area might be an outlier given its 
peculiar relationship to Legal Realism, and its trans-substantive dimension. 
Modern trends in the area, she notes, seem to be translating the basic 
lessons of Realism into a doctrinal approach, again recognizing the inevita-
bility (and importance) of legal doctrine that itself better represents the 
issues and values at stake.40 
Doctrine continues to play a critical role in the three primary areas of 
the common law: property, tort, and contract. In Henry Smith’s account, 
property law today remains heavily doctrinal primarily because of its basic 
structure as a “system” that seeks to manage the informational problems 
that flow from the law’s need to regulate complex interactions between 
an indeterminate number of individuals and discrete resources.41 Smith 
points out that despite Legal Realism–inspired claims about the “disintegra-
tion” of property and its fragmentation into an elusive “bundle of rights,” 
 
35 Id. 
36 Leiter, supra note 30, at 1983-84. 
37 Celia Wasserstein Fassberg, Realism and Revolution in Conflict of Laws: In with a Bang and 
Out with a Whimper, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1919, 1941 (2015). 
38 Id. at 1923-32. 
39 Id. at 1938-40. 
40 Id. at 1941-44. 
41 Henry E. Smith, The Persistence of System in Property Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 2055, 2057 
(2015). 
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the system of property law remains reliant on the basic architecture of its 
doctrinal devices, with the influence of Legal Realism having been felt only 
on the very peripheries of the system.42  
Ben Zipursky examines the role of doctrine in tort law by focusing on 
the legal concept of “reasonableness” and its use in negligence cases.43 
According to Zipursky, the concept of reasonableness has a definitive 
meaning within tort law, one that economic accounts (or indeed the Hand 
Formula) fail to capture. It involves focusing factfinders’ attention on a 
particular kind of person for their analysis, which derives from the reality 
that negligence law is built on the existence of duties of care that members 
of society owe each other in their everyday life.44 The doctrinal concept, he 
argues, captures a basic normative intuition about the role of tort law and its 
overall structure. In Zipursky’s account, negligence law can fruitfully 
continue to rely on the concept of reasonableness for both normative and 
structural reasons, without at the same time requiring an acceptance of its 
mechanistic role in legal reasoning.45 Reasonableness remains a robust 
doctrinal part of tort law, with a definitive meaning. 
In her discussion of contract law, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan captures a differ-
ent dimension of the law’s reliance on doctrine, namely, its influence on 
people’s intuitions about what contract law requires of them. 46  While 
recognizing that contract law continues to rely on a host of formal rules 
(e.g., consideration) in different contexts, she argues that consumers 
extrapolate from these legal rules to draw conclusions about the working of 
contract law in contexts where the law’s own provision of flexibility and 
protection might enable them to do otherwise.47 She thus identifies an 
additional constraining effect of legal doctrine, namely, its role in shaping 
(mis)perceptions about the obligatory requirements of the law.48  
A natural and well-known corollary to the question of doctrinal con-
straint is what some scholars refer to as the “indeterminacy thesis,” the 
belief that legal doctrine cannot provide determinate outcomes in individual 
cases, that additional extra-legal considerations are required, and that legal 
 
42 Id. at 2059-2061, 2067-74. 
43 Benjamin C. Zipursky, Reasonableness In and Out of Negligence Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 
2131, 2135 (2015). 
44 Id. at 260-65, 268-69. 
45 Id. at 2170. 
46 Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Intuitive Formalism in Contract, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 2109, 2110-11 
(2015). 
47 Id. at 2126. 
48 Id. at 2127-28. 
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doctrine is little more than window dressing.49 Leo Katz examines the 
applicability of the indeterminacy thesis within criminal law, offering 
nine different perspectives from which one might resolve, attenuate, or 
unwittingly exacerbate the problem.50 In acknowledging that it remains a 
“really hard problem,” Katz seemingly admits that legal doctrine does 
not operate as a complete constraint.51 All the same, by suggesting ways 
in which the problems of indeterminacy can be minimized, he seems to 
suggest that doctrine does indeed operate as a constraint in very many 
situations, even if it doesn’t do so perfectly. 
When we move away from basic areas of the law to the more specialized 
and statute-laden ones, the issue of doctrinal constraint becomes more 
complex. Here, unlike in other domains, questions of institutional role, 
separation of powers, and inter-governmental (i.e., federal–state, and inter-
branch) coordination become intertwined with doctrinal considerations 
within the domain of legal reasoning. Yet, here too we see doctrine 
constraining both the form and content of judicial reasoning.  
Melissa Murray examines this question within family law by looking at 
recent judicial interpretations of the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) within 
the state of California.52 Analyzing how courts have attempted to rely on 
the blackletter rules of the Act when presented with novel family arrangements 
and disputes, Murray concludes that doctrine certainly matters in this 
domain, and does indeed operate as a constraint.53 Yet, she argues that legal 
doctrine encapsulates more than just rules, cases, and regulation, but instead 
extends to certain ideals and principles that inform the interpretation and 
application of the rules and regulations. 54  In this regard, she echoes 
arguments famously made by Ronald Dworkin in his account of how 
“principles” inform the application of legal doctrine in hard cases, and thus 
enable courts to work within the parameters of the law in their 
decisionmaking.55 
Gideon Parchomovsky and I show how the Supreme Court creates law 
within the interstices of the federal copyright statute by identifying obvious 
 
49 For an overview of the indeterminacy problem in legal analysis, see generally Lawrence B. 
Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987). 
50 Leo Katz, Nine Takes on Indeterminacy, with Special Emphasis on the Criminal Law, 163 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1945, 1951 (2015). 
51 Id. at 1973. 
52 Melissa Murray, Family Law’s Doctrines, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1985,1989 (2015). 
53 Id. at 2012-17. 
54 Id. at 2017-18. 
55 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 38 (1977). 
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indeterminacies in the application of the statute’s primary directives.56 In so 
doing, we argue, the Court appears to be following an age-old approach to 
judicial lawmaking, referred to as the process of determining the “equity” of 
the statute. By adopting this approach, the Court’s jurisprudence accepts 
the indeterminacy critique of pure textualism, but at the same time shows 
fidelity to the constraint of core legislative ideals and principles that it 
discerns from the structure of the statute.57 Much like Murray’s point in 
family law, we argue that copyright doctrine—as revealed in the Court’s 
jurisprudence under the 1976 Copyright Act—extends to certain basic 
principles and ideals that it sees as integral to the working of the copyright 
system, that is, the “equity” of the copyright statute so to speak.58 The 
Court draws these principles from prior case law, the Constitution, or at 
times from its own intuitions; and at all times emphasizes that these 
principles constrain its decisionmaking. 
Moving to a third specialized area, the law of corporations, Edward 
Rock approaches the question of doctrinal constraint through a uniquely 
comparative lens.59 To examine the question of doctrinal constraint Rock 
takes two important corporate law issues—controlling shareholder 
freezeouts and bondholder exit consents—and within those issues con-
trasts the approaches of English and American courts.60 American judicial 
reasoning is commonly believed to have internalized the lessons of Legal 
Realism, whereas English judicial thinking is taken to represent the vestiges 
of Legal Formalism. Upon undertaking this fascinating comparison, Rock 
concludes that while judges in both legal systems arrive at more or less 
similar solutions to the problems that they identify, their “styles of 
decisionmaking are strikingly different.”61 American (i.e., Delaware) judges 
appear to tackle the policy and economic issues at stake directly as part of 
their reasoning, whereas English judges do so from within the language of 
case law and the traditional sources of legal reasoning. While Rock is 
circumspect about whether the difference actually affects outcomes in cases, 
he concludes that one of the effects of Legal Realism on reasoning in this 
domain may have been its relaxation of the stylistic (or formal) constraints 
 
56 Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Gideon Parchomovsky, Equity’s Unstated Domain: The Role of 
Equity in Shaping Copyright Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1859, 1865, 1871-72 (2015). 
57 Id. at 1887. 
58 Id. at 1888. 
59 Edward B. Rock, Corporate Law Doctrine and the Legacy of American Legal Realism, 163 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2019, 2029 (2015). 
60 Id. at 2029-48. 
61 Id. at 2048-49. 
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of legal doctrine, which has enabled lawyers and judges to focus more 
directly on the normative considerations at stake.62 
Alex Stein’s contribution to the Symposium looks at the role of doctrine 
within the law of evidence, an area that is at once both trans-substantive and 
of relevance to a variety of public law and private law areas.63 Critiquing 
versions of “antidoctrinalism” that are seen in the work of some scholars, 
Stein argues that evidence law is characterized by several “organizing principles” 
that draw on, and integrate, ideas from economics, morality and epistemology.64 
These organizing principles are in turn a central component of evidence law 
doctrine that courts and litigants apply to individual cases. Stein shows that 
evidence law (and jurisprudence) is incapable of being comprehended 
without appreciating the crucial role of these organizing principles in 
balancing the area’s incommensurable normative considerations, in turn 
reifying the centrality of legal doctrine to the area and the fundamentally 
“legal” nature of evidence discourse.65 
 
*      *      * 
 
What then do we take away from the reality that (a) doctrine remains an 
important component of legal reasoning in just about every area of the law, 
and (b) that its role and importance vary from one area to another? I think 
there are three tentative analytical lessons that may be drawn from these 
contributions.  
First, doctrine performs a variety of different roles within the domain of 
legal reasoning, ranging from providing actors with an independent normative 
basis for their decisionmaking, to allowing different institutional actors 
within a system to maintain their political legitimacy vis-à-vis each other, 
and in the minds of the lay public. Each of these roles “constrains” reasoning 
in important, but distinct ways. The constraint of doctrine is thus necessarily 
pluralist.  
Second, the sources of legal doctrine—that collectively constrain legal 
reasoning—vary from one substantive area to another, and from one 
institutional actor to another. Acknowledging the constraining effect of 
doctrine has thus meant that courts and litigants today seek to expand the 
 
62 Id. at 2052-53. 
63 Alex Stein, The New Doctrinalism: Implications for Evidence Theory, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 
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source and content of legal doctrine as part of their reasoning, rather than 
treat the new considerations that demand their attention as being purely 
“extra-doctrinal.” The most common technique in this regard appears to be 
a ready recourse to background “principles” that inform and animate the 
textual or formal content of rules and regulations.  
Third, while Legal Realism may not have eliminated all reliance on 
doctrine (and it is of course questionable whether this was ever its motivation), 
it has nonetheless had a discernible impact on our understanding of doctrine 
in the U.S. legal system. Doctrine is today seen as important, not for its 
own sake, but because of its connection to normative criteria that are 
deemed independently worthwhile for the law to adopt. In this sense, Legal 
Realism has succeeded in moving the inquiry from one rooted in the 
“science of law” to one striving to develop “science about law,” as Thurman 
Arnold famously put it.66 Legal doctrine is today seen as rooted in ideals 
from economics, moral philosophy, sociology, behavioral psychology, and 
political science in a way that has produced an equilibrium where doctrinal 
and non-doctrinal considerations are treated as equally important for a 
fuller understanding of the law. It is perhaps this equilibrium that we may 
appropriately identify as the “New Doctrinalism” of the American legal 
thinking. 
III. JOHN DICKINSON ON THE CONSTRAINT OF LEGAL RULES 
It is particularly fitting that this Symposium on the role of legal doctrine 
in legal reasoning is being published in the University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review. In addition to being the site of some of the most trenchant (and 
often times acrimonious) debates about Legal Realism,67 the journal was 
also the site of one of the earliest systematic explorations of this very topic 
during the heyday of Legal Realism, conducted by a former member of the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School faculty, John Dickinson.68 Dickinson 
was trained as a political scientist and lawyer, and spent a good deal of his 
scholarly attention exposing the inadequacies of extreme Legal Realism.69 
In an article titled Legal Rules: Their Function in the Process of Decision,70 he 
 
66 See Thurman W. Arnold, Institute Priests and Yale Observers—A Reply to Dean Goodrich, 84 
U. PA. L. REV. 811, 813 (1936). 
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69 See, e.g., John Dickinson, The Law Behind Law, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 113 (1929); John 
Dickinson, Legal Rules: Their Application and Elaboration, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 1052 (1931); John 
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set out to explore—in no uncertain terms—the extent to which legal rules 
(i.e., legal doctrine) constrain judicial decisions. His conclusion on the issue 
was rather poignant:  
The fact that legal rules do not always dictate decisions of cases does not, 
however, mean that they may not have influence, and sometimes a controlling 
one, in the process of decision. Sceptics who minimize the influence of such 
rules often seem only disappointed absolutists, who expected the traditional 
theory of legal determinism to work out to the bitter limit of its clock-work 
logic, and on finding it play them false, react into an opposite extreme of 
naïve unwillingness to recognize the less absolute, but none the less rela-
tively effective, way in which legal rules do their work, holding an impossibly 
exalted view of certainty, they insist on all or none.71 
In examining the issue, Dickinson’s piece undertakes a detailed survey of 
the ways in which judges employ legal rules, and the effect that such rules 
have on their thinking and reasoning.72 Indeed, he anticipates some of the 
principal mechanisms described previously, 73 including the framing role 
of legal doctrine as a source of constraint.74 While he disagreed with the 
claims of the extreme (or “skeptical”) school of Legal Realists, his core claim 
was that the central insights of Legal Realism—involving the role of 
“policy, taste, and value judgments” in judicial decisionmaking—were 
indeed compatible with a constraining role for legal doctrine,75 and that a 
happy equilibrium between them should not be ruled out in advance.  
Dickinson died young,76 and most of his work on the role of legal doc-
trine in legal reasoning remains underappreciated. The articles that follow 
pay implicit tribute to Dickinson’s line of inquiry by carrying it forward 
into the twenty-first century, and they do so by respecting his cautionary 
note that the question of constraint be approached in a less absolute and 
more nuanced manner, thereby making “sound progress” in our under-
standing of the “technique of legal thinking in the application and elabora-
tion of law.”77  
 
71 Id. at 835-36. 
72 Id. at 838-66. 
73 See supra Part I. 
74 Dickinson, Legal Rules, supra note 19, at 849. 
75 Id. at 868. 
76 George L. Haskins, John Dickinson: 1894–1952, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1952). 
77 Dickinson, Legal Rules, supra note 19, at 868. 
